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ABSTRACT 
Much of a Marine’s training happens on the job. Therefore, it is crucial that  
small-unit leaders are themselves capable and competent. In this thesis, I study the 
Advanced Mortarman Course (AMC), a program that trains small-unit leaders who in 
turn disseminate the knowledge they learned to Marines in their units who have not 
attended the school. In 2016, the AMC had an attrition rate of over 40 percent, which 
brings into question both the course content and the screening and selection process. It 
appears that the course content is appropriate, and so my analysis focuses on the 
screening and selection process. Using personnel records of students who attended the 
AMC between 2013 to 2014, I explore the statistical relationship between the likelihood 
of graduation and observable characteristics of the students. I find that General Technical 
scores, proficiency and conduct marks, and experience as a Marine, are significant 
determinants of success, while physical fitness is not. These findings can help operational 
commanders make better-informed decisions on which Marines should attend advanced 
training, thus ultimately reducing costs and increasing unit readiness. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of all training is to develop forces that can win in combat. 
Training is the key to combat effectiveness and therefore is the main effort 
of a peacetime military. 
— United States Marine Corps (1997) 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
Competent and capable leaders are vital components in developing a proficient 
and cohesive unit. In an infantry battalion, advance trained Mortarmen are a precious 
commodity that bring a vast amount of skills, knowledge, abilities, and leadership to 
those in their charge. Serving as their units’ primary trainers, mortar squad leader and 
section leaders are instrumental to increasing unit proficiency throughout the 
predeployment training program (PTP). 
Operating in an environment with constrained timelines, tight budgets, and 
manning reductions, infantry commanders must be cognizant of the limited opportunities, 
consequences, and benefits to sending their Marines to advanced level training, 
specifically, the Advanced Mortarman Course (AMC). Prospective students’ success is 
predicated on an effective command screening process that focuses on a Marine’s 
capabilities and qualities. The endstate is to receive a more knowledgeable, competent, 
and effective leader on his first attempt. Data collected from 1st Marine Division 
(1STMARDIV) and 2nd Marine Division (2NDMARDIV) in Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 
identify a potential problem with the screening and selection process. In FY 2016 
1STMARDIV and 2NDMARDIV experienced an attrition rate of 41 percent and  
46 percent for students attending AMC. This information drives a variety of questions 
pertaining to the screening process effectiveness, the qualities that aid in success, and 
policy implications for better use of the Marine Corps’ scarce time, funding, and 
resources. By identifying key measures of effectiveness and determinants of success, 
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commanders can make better informed decisions on which Marines attend in an effort to 
increase graduation rates and ultimately unit performance. 
B. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this study is to gain an enhanced understanding of critical 
characteristics influencing a Marine’s probability of success at AMC. This quantitative 
analysis uses empirical data collected from both East and West Coast AMCs and through 
regression analysis estimates a model to identify what the most significant determinants 
of an individual’s success are and whether or not there is an optimal mix of factors 
contributing to that success. This analysis also focuses on identifying the impact a 
Marine’s Time in Grade (TIG), Time in Service (TIS), and time with his unit have on 
graduation likelihood. Finally, I seek answers to which characteristics are most correlated 
with a Marine’s probability of survival throughout the training cycle. The benefits of this 
research are to reduce school house attrition rates, reduce personnel costs, and save time 
and physical resources. Finally, I provide additional insight into current Marine Corps 
policy regarding military occupational specialty (MOS) selection. 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this research is the student populations of past Advanced Infantry 
Training Battalion (AITB) East and West’s, AMCs. I use data on students who attended 
from FY 2013 through FY 2016. This timeline provides me with data from each of the 
four class iterations held per FY (five iterations for AMC East in FY 2016), providing a 
sample size of 1,217 observations. The data focuses on cognitive, performance, and 
experience categories for each observation. Based on these categories, analysis using a 
Marine’s performance records, training records, and individual demographics will 
determine if a statistical relationship exists between dependent and independent variables. 
The dependent variable in this model is whether a student graduates or fails. Independent 
variables include: Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test scores, 
deployment history, career duration, time with unit, proficiency and conduct (PROCON) 




I use the data analysis and statistical software package, STATA 14.2 for this 
study. The study is multifaceted and employs linear probability models (LPM) and 
survival analysis to identify the most influential determinants of an individual’s success 
at AMC. The first part of this study involves a series of univariate and multivariate 
stepwise regressions to assess the significance, impact, and predictive power of each 
independent variable on the likelihood of graduation. I control for class year and iteration 
fixed effects (FE) in all regressions to account for unobserved variables. Potential 
unobserved variables that may bias my results are changes in course schedules, peer 
effects, instructor cadres, instructional methods, and weather, terrain or seasonal effects. 
The second part incorporates all variables into one LPM and assesses the effects 
of each variable on the likelihood of graduation. 
The third part of this study focuses on survivability and uses survival analysis to 
identify which individual characteristics have the highest probability of impacting a 
Marine throughout the 38-day training cycle. I employ a Cox Proportional Hazard model 
to estimate the predictive nature of each covariate as Marines exit the initial state or fail 
the course at each training day. 
E. FINDINGS 
This study finds that General Technical (GT) scores, proficiency and conduct 
(PROCON) markings, and TIG for Lance Corporals (LCpls) are statistically and 
theoretically meaningful variables predicting graduation at AMC. 
My first finding further supports previous research and highlights the positive 
relationship between GT scores and the probability of survival. It is evident through 
survival analysis that increased levels of cognitive ability have significant impacts on a 
Marine’s probability to survive during AMCs most difficult training phases, to include 
FDC and advanced FDC evaluations. These events require a heightened degree of 
cognitive agility by testing a Marine’s skill in generating accurate firing data using 
mathematical computations, elevation and distance computations, map reading, general 
cognitive processing speed, and precision. 
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My second finding indicates PROCON marking is a statistically and economically 
significant predictor. In the operating forces, technically competent and tactically capable 
Marines traditionally have higher PROCON marks, which according to these findings are 
correlated with a Marine’s mastery of the course material, ultimately increasing the 
likelihood of graduation. Marines with the greatest likelihood of graduation are those 
who possess an average PROCON marking of 44 or above. 
My third finding links the high numbers of LCpls in the sample, with the 
predictive power of TIG. As data reveals LCpls with less than 18 months TIG are at a 
higher risk of failure than those with more than 18 months. With limited TIG a Marine is 
less likely to grasp the concepts and skills necessary to succeed at AMC. Deferment 
allows operational units to better prepare and guide their small unit leaders in the 
execution of their duties. It also provides them with additional time and experience 
operating their designated mortar systems, presumably increased technical and 
proficiency levels. 
Results from this study reinforce many of the findings in the wider body of 
literature pertaining to the predictive measures of success for military training. The 
greater majority of previous research identifies that GT scores, PROCON markings, 
physical fitness metrics and rifle scores are meaningful predictors of success. This study 
shows similar results across many of these variables, however, it highlights the difference 
in predictive power associated with Marine Corps standardized physical and performance 
metrics (CFT and rifle scores). AMC relies heavily on cognitive and MOS technical 
proficiency, which are elements operational commanders can use to better screen and 
select future candidates. 
F. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
This research is organized into six chapters. Chapter I provides an overview of the 
problem and identifies the purpose and methodology of the study. Chapter II provides 
background information on the Marine Corps’ formal training environment, the 
organization’s training philosophy, and in depth look at the 0341 MOS and AMC. 
Chapter III reviews relevant literature on training success for military service members. 
 5 
Chapter IV outlines data used in this research and describes the methodology for analysis. 
Chapter V discusses the results and analysis of each model. The study ends with, Chapter 
VI, a conclusion and recommendation section. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF INFANTRY AND ADVANCED 
MORTARMAN COURSE 
Condit, Diamond and Turnbladh’s 1956 study, Marine Corps Ground Training in 
World War II, best describes the Marine Corps’ philosophy and overall reputation of 
being a “fighting service” who in times of crisis “sought to put the greatest possible 
number of men on the firing line” (p. 196). They further articulate how the Marine Corps 
requires “a high order of technical skills in a great variety of specialties” (p. 196) to 
maintain this fighting capacity. Condit, et. al’s research provides valuable contextual 
insight regarding the Marine Corps need for rigid and formalized training. Regardless of 
the century or current nature of warfare, the need for technical skills in a combat 
environment is essential and helps pave the way for the current AMC training 
environment. 
In the 1940s and 1950s the Marine Corps faced considerable challenges with a 
major world war and later conflict on the Korean peninsula. In response to these events 
the Marine Corps dedicated considerable resources to develop a better, more formalized 
training institution built at Camp Geiger, North Carolina. It is here that advanced infantry 
training was born, geared towards preparing combat replacements for future deployments 
(School of Infantry East [SOI-E], (2017). Overseeing this training was the newly 
established command, the Infantry Training Regiment, that instructed all Marines in basic 
infantry fundamentals. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the Infantry Training Regiment saw considerable 
change in terms of its organizational structure and training duration. Organizationally, the 
Infantry Training Regiment experienced a split in their curriculum, providing separate, 
tailored training to infantry and non-infantry MOSs, a shift from the previously 
consolidated training curriculum. The Infantry Training Regiment’s growth skyrocketed 
in the early years of 1962 where upwards of 22,760 Marines graduated (SOI-E, 2017). As 
a result of this, the Marine Corps officially re-designated it as the 1st Infantry Training 
Detachment and later as the Infantry Training Company (SOI-E, 2017). 
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In 1979 the Infantry Training Company shifted from an adhoc training 
organization to a formal schoolhouse called Infantry Training School (SOI-E, 2017). 
Training duration also saw considerable change during this period. With a narrower 
focus, infantry Marines now received extended periods of instruction on advanced level 
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP); advanced weapons systems handling; and 
weapons employment lasting up to six weeks (SOI-E, 2017). These changes are of 
particular importance when considering today’s current emphasis placed on specialty 
training. 
By the end of the 1980s the Marine Corps re-designated the Infantry Training 
School to its current state, the SOI. The re-design brought forth three supporting 
establishments underneath the SOI’s command: 1) Infantry Training Battalion (ITB), 
designed to train Marines with infantry MOSs in basic and enhanced infantry skills; 2) 
Marine Combat Training (MCT), designed to train non-infantry Marines in basic infantry 
fundamental; and 3) Advanced Infantry Training Battalion, designed to “develop infantry 
small unit leaders and provide advanced skills training through professional instructors in 
order to empower Marines for service throughout the Operating Forces” (Advanced 
Infantry Training Battalion East [AITB-E], 2017). In order to execute their 
responsibilities AITB established five separate training courses to better serve all infantry 
MOSs: Advanced Anti-Tank Missile Gunner Course, Advanced Assault Marine Course, 
Advanced Machine Gunner Course, Advanced Infantry Marine Course, and Advanced 
Mortarman Course. 
Identifying training areas, establishing a formalized command structures, 
identifying training standards, and tailoring that training for infantry specialties are the 
steps the Marine Corps took to set the foundation for today’s current environment. This 
structure enabled AITB to more effectively create the current AMC curriculum. 
B. RENEWED EMPHASIS ON FIGHTING CONCEPT AND TRAINING 
In 2003, the Marine Corps was heavily engaged in the war on terror in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Fighting an unconventional enemy who employed asymmetric tactics 
forced the Marine Corps to adapt its warfighting strategy and renew the small wars 
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fighting concept. This change paved the way for increased operations at lower echelons 
where greater responsibility and decision-making was placed on the shoulders of small 
unit leaders, specifically squad and section leaders. In 2005, the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, then General Michael W. Hagee, approved the Marine Corps distributed 
operations concept, solidifying the need to operate at lower levels in a distributed fashion. 
He states that distributed operations are an “approach that will create an advantage over 
an adversary through the deliberate use of separation and coordinated, interdependent, 
tactical actions enabled by increased access to functional support, as well as by enhanced 
combat capabilities at the small-unit level” (United States Marine Corps, 2005, p. I). This 
“enhanced combat capability” is the foundation for the Marines Corps renewed emphasis 
on its human capital and structural underlining’s for AITBs advanced training courses 
(United States Marine Corps, 2005, p. I). 
In an effort to execute distributed operations the Marine Corps placed a renewed 
emphasis on training and developing their small unit leader community. From 2003 to 
2016 every Commandant of the Marine Corps presented some form of planning guidance 
to bolster the combat capabilities of small unit leaders through focused efforts on 
“realistic training and education systems” (United States Marine Corps, 2008, p. 14). In 
order to execute this concept, General James F. Amos emphasized investing in the 
education of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) and junior Officers based on their 
increased responsibilities while deployed or in a garrison setting (35th Commandant of 
the Marine Corps, 2010, p. 9). In 2016, General Robert B. Neller built upon General 
Amos’ guidance and instructed the Marine Corps to ensure force readiness through the 
“quality and challenging nature of our training” (United States Marine Corps, 2016a, p. 
6). In his guidance, he stipulates that “In all training, as in actual operations we will 
emphasize decentralizing authority and placing accountability down to the lowest level of 
leadership, to train as we fight” (United States Marine Corps, 2016a, p. 8). General 
Neller’s mandate links advanced training opportunities to the distributed operations 
concept. His vision adds an element of the realism to the Marine Corps formal training 
programs reinforcing General Hagee’s original statement to “Provide[s] junior leaders 
additional technical skills that will enable them to perform combat tasks normally 
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accomplished at higher levels of command” (United States Marine Corps, 2005, p. V, VI). 
Providing this realistic and challenging advanced training opportunity rests with the 
instructors of each advanced level AITB course. To effectively fight future adversaries 
this training must increase our small unit leader’s technical proficiencies and decision-
making abilities, ultimately building the organizations overall combat capacity. 
The Marine Corps’ emphasis on effective and realistic training did not reside 
solely at the organizational level, but was reinforced by commanding generals at lower 
echelons throughout the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF). In September 2013, Major 
General Lawrence D. Nicholson, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (1ST 
MARDIV), further emphasized small unit leader training to all his subordinate 
commanders.  1ST MARDIV Order 3501.1A (DIVO 3501.1A) (2013) directed 
commanding officers to ensure their platoon sergeants and squad/section leaders receive 
appropriate advanced level training and that those Marines “will complete their 
respective Infantry Unit Leaders and Advance Leader Course prior to deployment” (p. 1).   
DIVO 3501.1A (2013) served as a mechanism to “provide unit[s] with a more capable 
and effective combat leader” (p. 1).   As training guidance trickled down from the highest 
levels of the Marine Corps AITB quickly experienced a surge in student attendance, 
specifically for AMC. 
C. 0341 MILITARY OCCUPATION SPECIALTY 
An infantry battalion’s three 60 mm mortar sections and 81 mm mortar platoon 
are composed of Marines with the primary MOS of 0341, Infantry Mortarman and range 
in rank from Private through Sergeant. Charged with “the tactical employment of the 
M224, 60 mm light mortar and M252, 81 mm medium mortar” these Marines provide 
“indirect fire in support of the rifle and Light Armor Reconnaissance (LAR) squad, 
platoon and companies as well as support the actions of infantry and LAR battalions” 
(United States Marine Corps, 2016b, p. 3–44). In order to accomplish this a Mortarman 
holds a variety of billets, to include: Ammunition Man, Gunner, Assistant Gunner, 
Recorder, Forward Observer (FO), and Plotter (United States Marine Corps, 2016b). Of 
particular importance are senior Mortarman with the rank of Corporal (E4) or Sergeant 
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(E5) fulfilling supervisory billets as Squad and Section Leaders. Derived from the Navy 
and Marine Corps (NAVMC) 3500.44C entitled “Infantry Training and Readiness 
Manual” (2016), a Squad Leader and Section Leader are responsible for “the tactical 
employment of the mortar system” and “in addition to supervising the emplacement, 
laying and firing of the mortar, the squad or section leader supervises all other unit 
activities” (p. 14-3, 14-5). Navy and Marine Corps, 3500.44C also requires Infantry 
Mortarman to be able to accomplish the following tasks: 
1. Carries out the orders of the Mortar Section Leader or the unit 
Commander 
2. Carries out the orders of the Weapons Platoon Commander 
3. Trains the squad in the performance of tasks that training objectives 
4. Trains the squad in the performance of tasks that support platoon training 
objectives 
5. Trains the section in the performance of tasks that support section and/or 
platoon objectives 
6. Maintains the condition, care, and economical use of assigned weapons 
and equipment. 
7. Inspects the condition, care, and economical use of assigned weapons and 
equipment 
8. Advises the commander on the discipline, appearance, control, conduct, 
technical and tactical employment, and welfare of the section 
9. Assists the commander in conducting risk management 
10. Supervises operator maintenance for the M224A1 Mortar 
11. Supervises operator maintenance for the M252A2 81 mm mortar 
12. Writes and issues combat orders 
13. Controls mortar squad during occupation and displacement 
14. Communicates using proper communication procedures with organic 
wired and wireless communication 
15. Records all firing data 
16. Responsible for development and adherence to safety-T data 
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17. Operates the compass 
18. Assists the commander in conducting risk management 
19. Directs casualty collection and evacuation for the section 
20. Coordinates and supervises all logistical requirements for the section 
21. Supervises protective measures to counteract the effects of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical contamination 
22. Performs squad leader fire commands without a Fire Direction Center, 
utilizing a circular firing table and applying the LARS rule for corrections 
(Navy and Marine Corps, 2016, p. 14-3 – 14-5) 
D. ADVANCED MORTARMAN COURSE 
The mission of Advanced Mortarman Course is “To provide training and 
education to 0341s serving in the billet of mortar squad leader, section leader, Forward 
Observer, or a member of a Fire Direction Center.” (Infantry Unit Leaders Training 
Company West [IULTC-W], 2017).    The endstate of this training provides Fleet Marine 
Forces (FMF) with “Highly trained professionals capable of leading and executing across 
the range of military operations.” (SOI-E, 2017). In order to accomplish this students 
attend one of two training schoolhouses falling under the command of AITB-E located at 
Marine Corps Base, Camp Geiger, North Carolina or AITB-W located at Marine Corps 
Base, Camp Pendleton, California. Each fiscal year these two commands execute four 
AMCs and train a combined total of roughly 1,000 Marines. 
Armed with the responsibility to train and educate Marines on the proper 
employment and deconfliction of both the 60 mm or 81 mm mortar systems, AMC faces 
a challenging mandate. The training presented at AMC focuses on developing the 
Marines: 
60 mm mortar core competencies; 81 mm mortar core competencies; war 
fighting and decision making; small unit training; advanced land 
navigation; communications; combat orders; fire support planning; combat 
reports; motorized operations; call for indirect fire; close air support; 
reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of a mortar position; advanced 
techniques for mortar lay; adjustment of mortar fire without a fire 
direction center; basic fire direction center techniques; advanced fire 
direction center techniques; mortar employment techniques; and the 
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lightweight handheld mortar ballistic computer. (Advanced Mortarman 
Course, 2016, p. I-1) 
The course provides students with 410 hours of academic instruction spread 
across 38 training days. AMC instruction provides students with the necessary skills and 
doctrinal knowledge to operate in leadership positions. The curriculum is executed 
through a variety of formal lectures, practical application exercises, field training, and 
live fire exercises. At the conclusion of the course each student is evaluated during a field 
leadership evaluation (FLE) modeled around a tactical scenario (IULTC-W, 2017).  
Table 1 shows the number of hours devoted to each aspect of the course. 
Table 1.   Hours Spent on Each Training Evolution. Adapted from Advanced 
Mortarman Course (2016). 
 
 
In order to attend AMC, prospective students are first identified by their parent 
commands under the criteria of serving as or preparing to serve as a Squad or Section 
Leader. Screening, selecting, and preparing prospective students for AMC falls on the 
shoulders of the Marine’s Company Commander. He is the individual directly 
responsible for ensuring each Marine meets the required demographic, physical and 
technical prerequisites for AMC. Specific requirements are delineated in both the AMC 
Period of Instruction (POI) and command screening checklist. From an individual 
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perspective, potential students must be in an active or reserve status holding the rank of 
Corporal or Sergeant. Waivers are granted for Lance Corporals (E3) “when filling a 
Squad Leader billet” (Advanced Mortarman Course, 2016, p. I-2). The course also opens 
enrollment to both Officers and Staff Non Commissioned Officers (SNCO) on a space 
available basis. 
From a physical perspective, potential students must meet Marine Corps height 
and weight standard and have a minimum PFT score of 135 or minimum CFT score of 
190; based on seasonality of the testing period (Advanced Mortarman Course, 2016, p. I-
2). 
Finally, the Marine’s Company Commander must validate their technical skills 
from a “proficient” and “familiar” standpoint. Outlined in the AITB-W command 
screening checklist (2016), Marines must be proficient in “1) 60 mm mortar 
manipulation: mount a 60 mm mortar, small deflection, large deflection 2) 81 mm mortar 
manipulation: mount a 81 mm mortar, small deflection, large deflection refer realign, 
reciprocal lay, 3) lay a mortar with compass, and 4) boresight: boresight a 60 mm mortar, 
and boresight a 81 mm mortar.”  Potential students must also be familiar with critical 
infantry tasks to include the orders process, operate a very high frequency (VHF) radio, 
execute tactical reporting, conduct call for fire (CFF), conduct close air support (CAS), 
and submit helicopter landing zone (HLZ) brief (Advanced Infantry Training Battalion, 
2016). 
Marines attending AMC execute a variety of physical, mental, and practical 
application evaluations throughout the 38-day course. AMC identifies three separate 
circumstances in which a Marine can be dropped from the course. They are 1) academic 
failure, 2) disciplinary failure and 3) other. As with many of the Marine Corps school 
houses, students must achieve a passing grade of 80 percent on required tests and 
evaluations. In the event a student does not reach this threshold they are granted a 
remediation period and two subsequent remediation attempts to achieve the minimum 
score. While remediating their deficiencies student must attend an academic review board 
to ascertain the reason for the failure. If deemed purely procedural or knowledge based 
(as opposed to a lack of effort) the student will be allowed to remediate his failure. If a 
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student fails to meet the minimum score on their third remediation attempt they are 
automatically dis-enrolled from the course. Other disqualifying criteria include 
disciplinary failures for cheating or poor personal decisions outside the course schedule 
along with unforeseen circumstances (medical issues or personal complications). 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. MARINE CORPS STUDIES 
Training and educating small unit leaders to effectively lead and execute their 
duties can be a daunting task for any commander, especially when faced with compressed 
training timelines or limited school house quotas. As a result of this, commanders must 
take great care in identifying those Marines most capable of completing their basic or 
advanced level courses on the first attempt.   It is not difficult to see a common trend in 
the type, nature, and methodology used in Marine Corps formal training environments. 
With similarities in how instruction is presented, trained to, tested, and remediated we 
can accurately translate key variables of success from one course to another while 
expecting similar results. The results from three Marine Corps studies outlines a potential 
starting point for my analysis. Previous research indicates that training success is 
predicated on a variety of predictive factors stemming from an individual’s physical, 
cognitive or non-cognitive measure. Commanders who understand these factors will 
inevitably be able to better select Marines for advanced level training, which adheres to 
the Marine Corps’ organizational guidance to provide advanced training for small unit 
leaders. 
The use of cognitive predictive measures is hardly a new concept in the Marine 
Corps. Condit, Diamond and Turnbladh’s 1956 study of Marine Corps training during 
World War II, explains the assignment and training process for specialty MOSs. They 
mention that “at the outset of the war, the Marine Corps had in effect a selection system 
based on three criteria: education, previous experience, and aptitude” (Condit, Diamond 
& Turnbladh, 1956, p. 207). The authors identify 30 percent of the Marine Corps 
specialty MOSs, to include Infantry Weapons, require characteristics associated with the 
“previous experience” and “mechanical aptitude” categories (p. 208). 
In 1993, Captain Michael Snyder conducts an empirical analysis of student 
success at Marine Security Guard (MSG) School. His research focuses on identifying key 
variables in a Marine’s Master File to better predict their probability of graduation. His 
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analysis uses 1,794 observations throughout multiple MSG classes (Snyder, 1993, p. 47). 
Key variables used in Synder’s research applicable to this study are education levels, PFT 
scores, rifle scores, TIS, TIG, ASVAB scores, and current age (Snyder, 1993, p. 47). 
Using logistic regression models Snyder finds that PFT score, rifle score and GT 
scores are significant predictors of success at MSG School. He also finds other 
demographic factors of age, grade, race, and TIG as statistically significant (Snyder, 
1993, p. 70.). Snyder’s work is of particular importance when viewed against the Marine 
Corps’ renewed emphasis on advanced level training for small unit leaders. Unlike 
previous studies, his thesis links the predictive power of individual characteristics to 
training course success vice future job performance, something of interest in this study.  
Linking Snyder’s research to the current day infantry community is the work by 
Captain Albert Nowicki. In his master thesis titled, United States Marine Corps 
Reconnaissance Course: Predictors of Success (2017), he furthers the research discussion 
by identifying specific physical, cognitive, and non-cognitive aspects increasing a 
Marine’s overall probability of success at Basic Reconnaissance Course (BRC). 
Nowicki’s findings validate Snyder’s study and again identify PFT and GT scores as 
valid predictors of success. He finds that at the margin, students with a PFT score greater 
than 275 are 15.98 percent more likely to graduate BRC (Nowicki, 2017, p. 65). Through 
the use of a Cox Proportional Hazard model Nowicki identifies a one unit change in PFT 
score increase a student’s probability of success by one percent (Nowicki, 2017, p. 65). 
Additionally, his findings indicate a positive correlation between graduation, a Marines 
GT score and level of post high school education. His findings on PFT scores are of 
particular importance because they demonstrate the magnitude at which physical fitness 
metrics play towards a Marine’s success. These findings are important and can possibly 
translate to predicting graduation at AMC. 
The final Marine Corps study analyzed in this review is from Captain Greg 
Jaunal’s master thesis, titled: Leveraging Non-Cognitive Testing to Predict Success at 
USMC Scout Sniper School (2017). His empirical analysis studies predictive factors 
aiding in a Marine’s success at Scout Sniper Basic course. Using Probit regression 
models to constrain the effect of his independent variables on the dependent variable (1 = 
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graduation and 0 = failure), Jaunal finds a Marine’s PFT score, proficiency marks (PROs) 
along with components of their ASVAB test scores as statistically significant factors in 
predicting success (Jaunal, 2017, p. 36–37).   While his work validates the assumptions 
proposed by Snyder and Nowicki, he does identify one negative relationship pertaining to 
graduation and the specific range in which a Marines PFT score falls. He identifies that 
Marines with a mid-level PFT score are associated with an overall decrease in their 
probability of graduation (Jaunal, 2017, p. 36). This finding indicates that while 
significant towards success a Marines’ PFT score is most useful when associated with 
values closer to the upper tail. While still a valid predictor, this finding suggests 
additional scrutiny should be applied to each variable and categorical values should be 
considered for a better assessment. Based on its predictive strength I call out another 
statistically significant finding where Jaunal identifies that a Marine whose PRO 
markings fall below the population average of 4.4, will decrease “the probability of 
graduation by 19%” (Jaunal, 2017, p. 36). Used as a tool to assess technical proficiency 
this variable holds a high degree of economic significance. Jaunal also finds cognitive 
ability measured in the ASVAB subtest, Auto Shop (AS), is also a valid predictor of 
success. He proposes that technical familiarity and the use of tools aid in a Marine’s 
ability to manipulate their “scope and optic” (Jaunal, 2017, p. 37). The importance of 
these findings indicates that advanced training courses require a variety of complex 
technical, physical, and cognitive abilities. Variable selection and model choice need to 
be carefully tailored based on the individual nature of the course requirements. 
A critical component of Nowicki and Jaunal’s work is the application of non-
cognitive measures in their analyses. Analyzing both GRIT scale, defined by Jaunal 
(2017) as something that “seeks to determine an individual’s desire to complete tasks 
over time” and components of the Big Five Personality traits, such as conscientiousness; 
we conclude that a Marine’s success is further predicated on personality and character 
traits (p. 13). This research is of particular importance when analyzing advanced level 
training curriculums in an effort to determine if purely academic and performance 
evaluations are the main determinants of failure or if willingness and fortitude in the face 
of adversity have a play. 
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B. OTHER MILITARY STUDIES 
After reviewing relevant literature on military training, one can quickly see a 
common thread amongst the findings. Linking and more importantly validating many of 
the researchers’ studies is the use of ASVAB test scores as an effective predictor of 
success. In 1990, Paul Mayberry and Catherine Hiatt conduct a study on infantry job 
performance using ASVAB test scores as a baseline measurement tool. Their research 
focuses on assessing job performance as outlined by a previous joint service Job 
Performance Measurement (JPM) project, while incorporating additional cognitive 
testing predictors as supplements to the ASVAB test. Mayberry and Hiatt (1990) 
conclude, “The ASVAB does an excellent job of predicting a variety of infantry 
performance measures, hands-on-performance tests, written job knowledge tests, and 
infantry school training grades” (p. 24). Due to the marginal impacts of these 
supplemental tests, Mayberry and Hiatt (1990) conclude that larger gains are achievable 
by merely refining the current ASVAB test instead of creating a modified one (p. 26). 
Validating the use of ASVAB test scores is the work by Driskell, Hogan, Salas, 
and Hoskin (1994) who analyze student success at Naval basic electricity and electronic 
(BE&E) training course. Similar to Mayberry and Hiatts work, their research focuses on 
using ASVAB test scores as a baseline measurement tool while applying additional 
personality predictors to better assess BE&E training performance. The findings reveal 
that the ASVAB subtest Mathematics Knowledge (MK), is the best predictor for 
academic performance (Driskell, Hogan, Salas, & Hoskin, 1994, p. 39). The authors 
continue to expound on the benefits of using the ASVAB test as a valid predictor stating, 
“Research indicates that training success can be predicted consistently with cognitive 
measures” but further elaborate on how characteristics such as “conscientiousness, 
ambition, and intellectual curiosity” also affect training success (Driskell, Hogan, Salas, 
& Hoskin, 1994, p. 44). The studies conducted by Mayberry and Hiatt coupled with the 
work done by Driskell, Hogan, Salas, and Hoskin provide insight into the applicability 
and usefulness of the ASVAB test. As identified, this cognitive measure is not the single 
source for predicting training success but merely serves as the most reliable variable 
available to the military. 
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA SOURCES 
I use two data sources in this study: school house data on mortarmen students 
collected from the AMC staff at AITB East and West, and general personnel data from 
the Marine Corps’ master files, Total Force Database Warehouse (TFDW). 
Schoolhouse data collection began at the source, the Advanced Infantry Training 
Battalion East and West staff responsible for administering the AMC. The AMC staff 
provided rosters of students spanning from FY 2013 through FY 2016. Both sets of 
rosters are broken into four class iterations per FY with an additional class iteration added 
in FY 2016 for AMC East. My empirical analysis recognizes variation in the level of 
detail with school house data. Due to archival issues, I am missing attendance rosters and 
graduation information for two AMC East classes in FY 2013 (3-13, 4-13) and one class 
in FY 2014 (1-14). TFDW’s archival capabilities serve as the mechanism to correct for 
and obtain a master roster and graduation information for the missing classes. 
School house data is organized into multiple databases divided between classes 
and year. The files contain students’ Department of Defense (DOD) identification 
number, electronic data interchange personal identifier (EDIPI), name, rank, unit/
company, monitored command code (MCC), completion code, and/or completion date. 
This data provides the sample size and composition necessary to collect specifics on 
previous students.  
The second and main source of data comes from Total Force Database 
Warehouse. TFDW is an organization that complies and archives 30 years of personnel 
data from multiple Marine Corps databases. Using consolidated AMC Excel files, I 
requested personnel data at two points in a Marine’s career, the most recent snapshot 
prior to the course convene date and the snapshot on the last day of the course graduation 
month, covering three areas cognitive, performance, and experience. The ten TFDW files 
I use are listed in Table 2. 
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B. DATA CLEANING AND MERGING 
The first step I take is cleaning and merging all information into AMC master 
files for each coast. I use TFDW’s BIR file to generate AMC West and SCHOOLS file to 
generate AMC East’s masters. I chose these databases because they contain the most 
uniquely identifiable variables per observation when compared to the remaining nine 
databases. I remove all Marines who registered for a class but for unforeseen reasons did 
not attend. Finally, I remove any irrelevant historical or post-graduation month TFDW 
snapshots. This process is replicated on the remaining TFDW files. Once clean, I append 
each database to its associated master file. 
I use unique identification variables class, dod_id, last_name, and first_name to 
match observations from both the master and using files. These variables allow for 95 
percent accuracy between merges. With a consolidated master file, I give the 
observations randomly generated observations numbers and remove any personally 
identifiable information (PII). 
C. SAMPLE 
The sample consists of 1,217 enlisted Mortarman who attended AMC in FY 2013 
through FY 2016. Each Mortarman is a unique observation specific to a class iteration 
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and year group. Table 3 contains summary statistics for the variables used in this 
analysis. The sample consists of all males, primarily white (90 percent), averaging 22 
years old. The largest portion of this sample is Lance Corporals, at 59 percent, followed 
by Corporals (Cpl), at 32 percent, and Sergeants (Sgt), at 9 percent. I exclude Officers 
and SCNOs from the analysis to better assess the primary enlisted training audience. 
Cognitive and performance variables depicted in Table 3 are continuous in nature, 
each with an associated mean value measured against the entire sample. Experience 
variables corresponding to rank, TIG and unit duration are continuous in nature and have 
mean values measured against only those observations tied to each specific rank from the 
sample. Variables corresponding to rank, TIG and unit duration less than 18 months are 
binary in nature with mean values measured against the entire sample. Additionally, 
summary statistics indicate that prior to AMC, 38 percent of the sample have deployed at 
least once. Educationally, each Marine possesses a high school diploma or equivalent 
degree and a mere 5 percent of the sample have post high school experience. 
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Table 3.   Summary Statistics. 
 
 
Next, I summarize in Figures 1 through 9 the sample’s continuous variables to 
better understand their frequency and overall distribution. Figure 1 represents the samples 
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age distribution, with Marines ranging from 19 to 33 years old. A Marine’s composite 
number of deployments is depicted in Figure 2, which displays that the majority of the 
sample has never deployed. Figures 3 through 5 depict the distribution of rank as it 
applies to average TIG.   Figure 6 represents the sample distribution in PROCON 
markings, ranging from 40 to 47. Distribution of GT scores are identified in Figure 7. 
Finally, movement to contact and maneuver under fire times are represented in Figures 8 
and 9, with the X axis representing time, depicted in minutes, seconds format. 
 
Figure 1.  Age Distribution. 
 
Figure 2.  Number of Deployments Distribution. 
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Figure 3.   Lance Corporal TIG Distribution. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Corporal TIG Distribution. 
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Figure 5.  Sergeant TIG Distribution. 
 
Figure 6.  PROCON Distribution. 
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Figure 7.  GT Distribution. 
 
Figure 8.  Movement to Contact Time Distribution. 
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Figure 9.  Maneuver under Fire Time Distribution. 
Table 4 shows the cohort sizes for class year and iteration as well as graduation 
rates. In general, graduation rates have declined over time. 




D. VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
I study two dependent variables related to graduation or failure from the course. 
The first is a binary indicator of graduating or not. The second is a continuous variable of 
the number of days a student lasted in the course; if a student graduated, this variable 
takes the value of 38 days, the length of the course. 
The first variable category I consider in this analysis pertains to a Marine’s 
cognitive abilities. I avoid omitted variable bias by creating a variable labeled GT to 
represent a Marine’s mental dexterity or cognitive abilities. To generate GT scores, I sum 
two separate subtests from a Marine’s Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT): 
Arithmetic Reasoning (AR) and Verbal Expression (VE). This variable eliminates 
collinearity between using a Marine’s composite AFQT score and any other subtests; 
which I exclude from this analysis. Wooldridge (2013) identifies that variables with 
measurement scales difficult to interpret are often best measured using standard 
deviations. I create a standardized GT variable using z-score by subtract the mean of GT 
and divide by its standard deviation (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 189). This variable is 
important in this analysis because it serves as a common Marine Corps recruiting and 
assessment tool that pairs intellectual levels with MOS selection. 
I also look at other infantry MOSs and identify two specialties with minimum 
required scores greater than that of Mortarmen. To further analyze the effects of 
potentially increasing the minimum Mortarman GT score I create two separate dummy 
variables. The first is a GT score of 100 or greater, representing the minimum required 
for a Scout Snipers and the second is a GT score of 105 or greater, representing the 
minimum required for a Basic Reconnaissance Marines. 
The second variable category in this study pertains to a Marine’s individual and 
billet performance. The first variables I use are proficiency and conduct markings. 
Proficiency and conduct marks are an assessment tool measuring a Marine’s overall job 
performance based on technical proficiency, reliability, and unit contribution. According 
to the Marine Corps’ Individual Records Administration Manual (IRAM), a Marine can 
fall into three PROCON categories without negative implications; Average, with 
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markings ranging from 40–44, excellent, with markings ranging from 45–48, and 
outstanding, with markings ranging from 48–50 (United States Marine Corps, 2000, p. 4–
42)  Sample data indicates that all Marines fall into the average or excellent category. To 
maintain an accurate picture of each Marine, more commonly referred to as the “whole 
Marine concept,” I generate one PROCON variable (United States Marine Corps, 2000, 
p. 4–42). I construct this variable by averaging a Marines’ proficiency in service and 
conduct in service markings. This technique enables me to reduce the correlation (rho 
value = .85) between each variable. 
Another performance variable in this analysis is CFT score. The CFT serves as 
one of the Marine Corps primary physical fitness evaluations. Due to low variation in the 
sample’s composite CFT scores I discard this variable and focus the analysis on two of its 
three subcomponent scores; the movement to contact and maneuver under fire tests. From 
a theoretical standpoint, these subcomponents relate directly to a Mortarman’s ability to 
perform various assignments such as rapid movement to, establishing, and maintaining a 
mortar firing position. 
The last performance variable I use in this study is rifle classification rating. This 
categorical variable links training tasks, such as the five crew drill steps or leveling the 
bubbles on the mortar system to individual characteristics such as fine motor skills 
(precision and hand-eye coordination), mathematical knowledge, and effectiveness in 
time constrained settings. I recode the four TFDW rifle classifications in sequential order 
ranging from the lowest (unqualified) to the highest (expert) with values from 1–4. 
The third and final variable category I use contains data from Marines career 
experiences and individual demographics. I begin by viewing a Marine’s educational 
history and create a categorical variable to better assess the impact of having higher 
levels of civilian education. I consolidate the three advanced degree categories (one 
semester college, bachelors, and master’s degrees), and generate a dummy variable for 
post high school observations. 
Next, I turn my focus to a Marine’s operational and career experiences in order to 
determine the impact of real world training, exercises, and operations on graduation 
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likelihood. I asses a Marine’s deployment history by analyzing TFDW’s continuous 
variable number of deployments. I replace missing values with 0 to indicate a Marine has 
not conducted an operational deployment. With 62 percent of the sample not having a 
deployment, I focus on the binary indicator of having ever deployed. 
Time in grade is another important indicator of experience. I generate this 
variable by subtracting the Marines individual course completion date from their present 
date of rank and divide by 30 days. 
Wooldridge (2013) explains that “interaction terms allow for the partial effect of 
an explanatory variable to depend on the level of another variable.”  To better assess the 
relationship between rank and TIG I generate six interaction variables combining each 
rank into two categories, Marines with less than 18 months TIG and Marines with greater 
than 18 months TIG, displayed in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Time in Grade and Rank Interaction Variables. 
 
 
Finally, I seek answers regarding the impact unit duration has on graduation. To 
do this I create a continuous variable representing the total months a Marine spends with 
his operational unit prior to attending AMC. This variable helps identify whether or not 
unit time, which includes training exercises, training courses, and deployments are 
relative factors contributing to graduation. I generate this variable by subtracting a 
Marine’s individual course convene date from their present unit join date and divide by 
30 days. 
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Similar to TIG interactions, I seek effects of unit duration as it pertains to rank 
and generate interaction variables for LCpls, Cpls, and Sgts. A breakdown of the 
interaction variables is displayed in Table 6. 




The first step in my analysis involves a series of stepwise regression techniques to 
pinpoint the bivariate correlates of graduation. Then, I run a multiple regression of 
graduation on all the potential correlates, using the Linear Probability Model for ease of 
interpretation. 
 
Holding all other variables constant, the LPM explains that graduation y, is 
estimated on: 
β0 = the intercept 
β1 = change in the graduation likelihood with 1 unit change in GT score. 
β2 = change in graduation likelihood with 1 unit change in proficiency and 
conduct score. 
β3 = change in graduation likelihood with 1 unit change in rifle qualification 
classification. 
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β4 = change in graduation likelihood with 1 unit change in movement to contact 
time. 
β5 = change in graduation likelihood with 1 unit change in maneuver under fire 
time. 
β6= change in graduation likelihood for Marines 21 years of age or younger. 
β7 = change in graduation likelihood for Marines with one or more number of 
operational deployments. 
β8 = change in graduation likelihood for Marines who are LCpls. 
β9 = change in graduation likelihood for Marines who are Cpls. 
β10  = change in graduation likelihood for Marines with less than 18 months TIG. 
β11 = change in graduation likelihood for LCpls with TIG less than 18 months 
TIG 
β12 = change in graduation likelihood for Cpls with TIG less than 18 months TIG 
β13  = change in graduation likelihood for Marines with unit durations less than 18 
months. 
β14 = change in graduation likelihood for LCpls with unit durations less than 18 
months. 
β15 = change in graduation likelihood for Cpls with unit durations less than 18 
months. 
ε = error term. 
The incremental nature of AMCs curriculum requires Marines to master 
techniques and employ them in subsequent and more complex phases; raising the 
question of overall survivability. A Marine’s overall duration or as Wooldridge (2013) 
describes, “a variable that measures the time before a certain event occurs” is of 
particular importance in this analysis. I focus on duration by analyzing each Marine as 
they enter the initial state, or begin each course. I further observe the duration at which 
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they exit the initial state. Exit criteria is a result of two reasons: 1) failure: academics, 
skills mastery, or other and 2) censored: completed the 38-day training cycle. I generate a 
training day variable by subtracting a Marine’s class graduation date from their individual 
completion date and divide by 5/7. This provides me with a duration variable exclusive of 
weekend days that would increase the overall course length. I then subtract that number 
from 38. Marines with a value of 38 completed the course while any other value indicates 
the exact duration from convene date to time t, failure. 
Survival probability is analyzed using a hazard function. I employ a Cox 
Proportional Hazard model in order to identify individual characteristics that increase a 
Marine’s probability of survival in subsequent phases, given the Marine survived up to 
the start of that particular phase. The model provides the predicted hazard rate h, at each 
training day t, given the covariate x, for each observation j. 
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. STEPWISE ANALYSIS 
I conduct stepwise regression using single and multivariate linear probability 
models to better identify and assess the impacts of each variable on graduation. I control 
for FE related to changes in class year and iteration in all models. I evaluate the 
predictive power of those variables associated with each category (cognitive, 
performance, and experience) mentioned in Chapter IV. 
The first category of variables I analyze focuses on a Marine’s cognitive abilities 
as measured in the ASVAB. Column 1 of Table 7, indicates that a one unit increase in 
overall GT score is roughly associated with a one percentage point increase in graduation 
likelihood. The predictive power of a Marine’s GT score produces sizeable impacts when 
compared against the sample graduation mean of 0.71. Disaggregating GT into the 2 
main sub-components, arithmetic reasoning and verbal expression, Column 2 shows that 
arithmetic reasoning, or the ability to execute mathematical word problems, is the 
stronger predictor of graduation. In particular, a 1 unit increase in arithmetic reasoning 
score is associated with a 1.4 percentage point rise in the likelihood of graduation, while 
a 1 unit increase in verbal expression score is only associated with a 0.4 percentage point 
increase. 
I also standardize the ASVAB components, subtracting the mean and dividing by 
the standard deviation. Column 3 show that one standard deviation change in GT score 
increases a Marine’s likelihood of graduation by 9.8 percentage points. Column 4 takes 
the same approach as Column 2 and breaks GT into its standardized subcomponents. The 
results are similar to earlier findings and reveal arithmetic reasoning to be the most 
influential predictor of graduation. Specifically, a change of one standard deviation in 
arithmetic reasoning contributes to a 9.2 percentage point increase in the likelihood of 
graduation, while a change of one standard deviation in verbal expression is only 
associated with a 2.3 percentage point increase. I also incorporate all ASVAB 
subcomponents into the regression to determine which variables are the strongest 
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predictor of graduation, the findings are denoted in Column 5. Results reveal a strong 
shift in the predictive power of arithmetic reasoning, reducing its magnitude from 9.2 
percentage points to 4 percentage points when variable mathematical knowledge is 
included. Mathematical knowledge is now the strongest predictor, associating a one unit 
change in standard deviation to increasing the likelihood of graduation by 9 percentage 
points (p<.01). 
Table 7.   Cognitive Variables, Stepwise Regressions. 
 
 
The second category of variables I analyze focuses on a Marine’s performance 
during annual tests and semi-annual evaluations. I use univariate regressions to compare 
variables listed in Columns 1–5 of Table 8 against graduation. Results in Column 1 
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indicates PROCON markings as a significant predictor and associate a one unit change to 
an 11.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of graduation (p<.01). Column 2 
displays the predictive strengths of each of the two PROCON subcomponent, proficiency 
markings and conduct markings. The table reveals proficiency markings as the strongest 
predictive variable of graduation. In particular, a 1 unit increase in proficiency score is 
associated with an 8.5 percentage point rise in the likelihood of graduation, while the 
remaining subcomponent, conduct markings, is statistically insignificant. Additionally, I 
analyze the predictive power of PROCON categories on graduation, applying it to an 
increase from the “average” PROCON category, with markings ranging from 40–44 to 
the “excellent” PROCON category, with markings ranging from 45–48 (United States 
Marine Corps, 2000, p. 4–43). This translates to a Marine moving into the top 90 - 95th 
percentile for the sample. Findings point to a 14.5 percentage points rise in the likelihood 
of graduation for those Marines receiving excellent PROCON markings. When compared 
against the mean graduation rate of .71 this implies a 20.4 percent increase in their 
chance of graduating. 
Using a univariate regression, I find that a Marine’s rifle qualification 
classification is statistically insignificant and not a valid predictor of graduation. Table 8 
also shows that physical characteristics have minimal predictive power on the likelihood 
of graduation. Column 5 of Table 8, shows that a Marine’s composite CFT score is not 
considered statistically significant. However, disaggregating CFT score into its three 
main sub-components, movement to contact, ammo can lift, and maneuver under fire, I 
find a negative relationship, albeit with minimal predictive strength between movement 
to contact time and graduation. Column 6 shows a that a one unit increase in movement 
to contact time is associated with a 0.1 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of 
graduation (p<.1). I remove ammo can lift scores from the analysis in Column 7 due to 
limited variation in the data, which reveals no impact on the predictive strength of the 
other two variables. 
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Table 8.   Performance Variables, Stepwise Regressions. 
 
 
The third category of variables I analyze describe a Marine’s experiences and 
demographics. Column 2 of Table 9 indicates that the number of deployments are a 
significant predictor of graduation. In particular, a Marine that has been deployed one or 
more times has a 3.4 percentage point lower likelihood of graduation (p<.05) than a 
Marine who has never been deployed. I highlight the importance of this variable as its 
predictive power substantially increase in future analyses. 
I also focus on the predictive power of a Marine’s rank and break the sample into 
its three main categories, LCpls, Cpls, and Sgts; Sgts serving as the base. Column 4 
suggests that when separate of other variables, rank is not statistically significant. An 
important discovery is the changes in rank coefficients when TIG is introduced to the 
multivariate models. Column 5 reveals a substantial change in the predictive nature of 
LCpls with less than 18 months TIG. Findings indicate that LCpls with less than 18 
months TIG are 19.8 percentage points less likely to graduate (p<.05). The last finding in 
Table 9 is identified in Column 6, and indicates that rank and unit duration are 
statistically insignificant predictors of graduation. 
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Table 9.   Experience Variables, Stepwise Regressions. 
 
 
B. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
I develop a final LPM by regressing those statistically significant predictors 
identified in the stepwise analysis into one single model. I begin by regressing all 
variables together, excluding TIG and unit duration as denoted in Column 1 of Table 10. 
The results and magnitude of each predictor are fairly similar to earlier findings, with one 
noticeable change in the predictive strength associated with the number of deployments 
variable. In particular, a Marine with one or more deployment is now associated with an 
9.9 percentage points decrease in their likelihood of graduation, ultimately increasing the 
failure amount from previous regressions by 6 percentage points (p<.01). 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 10 include TIG and unit duration into the regressions. 
Minor changes associated with the GT and number of deployment coefficients are 
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depicted in Column 2. Additionally, LCpls with less than 18 months TIG are associated 
with a 20.1 percentage point decrease in their likelihood of graduation (p<.05). Column 3 
of Table 10 indicates that the inclusion of a Marine’s unit duration has minimal effects on 
the predictive power of each significant variable. 
The final LPM I use in this study is depicted in Columns 4 which accounts for all 
variables while controlling for class FEs. Significant variables in Column 4 are GT, 
PROCON, movement to contact, number of deployments, and LCpls with less than 18 
months TIG. For GT score, a one unit increase is associated with roughly one percentage 
point increase in the likelihood of graduation (p<.01). To better understand the context of 
this variable a Marine scoring 10 points higher on their GT score (e.g., mean of 106, 
Marine scoring 116) is 8 percentage points more likely to graduate. With a mean 
graduation rate of 0.71, a 10-point increase in score increases the Marine’s likelihood of 
graduation by 11.3 percent. The model suggests a minimal increase in PROCON strength 
from earlier analyses, associating a 10.4 percentage point rise in the likelihood of 
graduation (p<.01). For example, the magnitude of this coefficient suggests that when a 
Marine increases their average PROCON markings from 44 to 45 there is a 14.6 percent 
increase in the chance of graduation. 
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Table 10.   Linear Probability Model Regression. 
 
 
While movement to contact is a statistically significant predictor the magnitude of 
its coefficient, -0.001 suggests minimal theoretical impacts on graduation and again 
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represents minimal changes from earlier analyses. Similarly, Column 4 indicates that the 
impact of a Marine’s number of deployments remains fairly constant from previous 
analyses. The coefficient, -0.107, signifies that a Marine with one or more deployments is 
10.7 percentage points less likely to graduate AMC (p<0.01). I hypothesize this negative 
relationship is predicated upon variations in training methodologies and doctrinal 
concepts inherent with a Mortarman’s time and experience on deployments. Junior 
Marines have limited opportunities to interact in a formal school setting and on 
deployment potential exists to develop habits that stray from doctrine. In essence, this 
learning has the ability to generate poor behavior habits and muscle memory; clashing 
with established standards taught and evaluated at AMC. The final statistically significant 
variable is LCpls with less than 18 months TIG, showing a 18.9 percentage point 
decrease in overall graduation likelihood. This translates to a junior LCpl being 26.6 
percent less likely to graduate. The remaining variables in Column 4 of Table 10 fall 
outside the range of statistical significance, having a p>.1. 
C. SURVIVAL ANALYSIS 
I use a Cox Proportional Hazard model and simultaneously assess the magnitude 
each covariate plays on a Marine’s rate of survival during the 38-day course. The first 
step in I take in this analysis is identify the time in which each Marine attrite or are 
censored out. Training day, frequency of attrition, and percentage of the sample censored 
out are depicted in Table 11. One limitation with this analysis is variations in course 
schedules between coasts and class years. To correct for schedule variance, I use recent 
course schedules and categorize events into four separate blocks, linking the most 
significant evaluations to a range of training days. The first block, training days 1–4, 
account for failures related to mortar system core competency evaluations and land 
navigation evaluations. The second block, training days 7–18, account for failures related 
to basic FDC evaluations. The third block, training days 21–27, account for failures 
related to advanced FDC evaluations, while the fourth block, training days 30–34, 
account for failures related to course final evaluations and live fire field exercises (N. 
Leeds & K. Jensen, emails to author, May 25, 2017, and October 18, 2017). 
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Table 11.   Survival Analysis Statistics: Attrition Frequencies and Percentage. 
 
 
Limited variation in the mean PROCON scores for each failure on each training 
day force me to generate a binary variable to better assess PROCONs overall probability 
of failure. I generate a binary variable to categorize Marines with the sample mean 
PROCON score or below against those with higher scores. 
Results from the Cox Proportional Hazard analysis depicted in Table 12 suggest 
that GT scores, PROCON markings, movement to contact times, number of deployments, 
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and LCpls with less than 18 months TIG are meaningful predictors impacting Marines 
probability of survival. 
The most significant covariate predicting survival at AMC is PROCON markings, 
suggesting that those with a PROCON marking of 43 or lower are 49 percent more likely 
to fail than those with a higher marking (p<.01). The second most influential covariate is 
LCpls with less than 18 months TIG, showing that on average, a LCpl with less than 18 
months TIG is 44 percent more likely to fail than those with greater than 18 months 
(p<.1). The third most substantial covariate is number of deployments, indicating that a 
Marine with 1 or more deployment increases their probability of failure by 27 percent. 
GT score is the final covariate attributing to a Marine’s probability of failure at AMC. 
Findings indicate that a Marine with a 1 unit increase in GT score is 4.7 percent less 
likely to fail AMC (p<.01). I also find the covariate movement to contact as statistically 
significant, although it’s hazard ratio suggests minimal impact on the probability of 
graduation. Results show that a Marine with a 1 unit increase in movement to contact 
time (a 1 second increase in raw score time) is .4 percent more likely to fail (p<.1). 
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Table 12.   Survival Analysis Regression. 
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Figure 10 graphs PROCON survival rates across each training day. The upper 
bound is the survival rate for Marines with markings higher than the sample mean of 43, 
while the lower bound represents the survival for Marines at or below the mean score. 
Figure 10 reflects PROCONs survival qualities, attributing higher PROCON scores to a 
greater likelihood of survival, especially during training blocks 2 (training day 7–18) and 
block 3 (training day 21–27). 
 
Figure 10.  Mean PROCON Markings, Survival Analysis Results. 
Figure 11 graphs GT survival rates across each training day. The upper bound is 
the survival rate for Marines with a GT score of 110, the minimum to be an officer. The 
lower bound indicates the required minimum GT score for Mortarman, 80. The remaining 
rates highlight other similar infantry MOS minimum scores. Figure 11 reflects similar 
survival qualities as PROCONs, attributing higher GT scores to a greater likelihood of 




Figure 11.  GT Score, Survival Analysis Results. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this study is to determine if a Marine’s personal attributes and 
career experiences are meaningful predictors of success at AMC. I conduct regression 
analyses using empirical data to identify those characteristics affecting graduation in an 
effort to lower school house attrition rates, reduce personnel costs, and save time and 
physical resources. Additionally, this study provides insight to operational commanders 
and assists them in making better informed decisions during their screening and selection 
process. The benefit to increasing the rigors of the selection and screening process is to 
ensure prospective students are more likely to complete the training on their first attempt. 
Timely success at AMC translates to additional opportunities for small unit leaders to 
train, develop, and employ their advanced skills with their units. This will ultimately 
increase the units overall tactical proficiency and combat readiness. 
As literature suggests, cognitive abilities represented in a Marine’s ASVAB test 
scores are valid predictors of success during military training. My first finding further 
supports previous research and highlights the magnitude of GT scores on the probability 
of survival. This study’s findings coincide with findings from Diskell et. al’s research and 
identify ASVAB subcomponents to be key measures of effectiveness in military training. 
Again, this study’s survival analysis further emphasizes that increased levels of cognitive 
ability have more of an impact impacts on a Marines probability of survival during 
difficult training phases, to include FDC and advanced FDC evaluations. These events 
require a heightened degree of cognitive agility and test a Marine’s skill in generating 
accurate firing data using mathematical computations, elevation and distance 
computations, map reading, general cognitive processing speed, and precision. 
In response to the GT score findings, I recommend additional research be 
conducted on changing the current Marine Corps policy regarding the minimum required 
GT score of 80. Research should focus on the effects of increasing the minimum score 
against the entire 0341 population. Identifying the population mean will help establish a 
new, suitable minimum threshold. Recommendations for potential thresholds can be 
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based around other infantry MOSs, such as Scout Snipers, requiring a minimum score of 
100 or even Basic Reconnaissance Marines, requiring a non-waiverable score of 105. 
My second finding indicates PROCON marking is a statistically and economically 
significant predictor. In the operating forces, technically competent and tactically capable 
Marines traditionally have higher PROCON marks, which according to these findings 
directly affect a Marine’s mastery of the course material, ultimately increasing their 
likelihood of graduation. Additionally, results from this study’s survival analysis 
indicates that a Marine with a PROCON marking at or below the sample mean is more 
likely to fail than those above the mean. The survival analysis results further support 
previous research identified by Janual in Chapter III. To ensure the most technically 
competent Marines attend AMC, I recommend adding a minimum PROCON marking to 
the course prerequisites to ensure the most qualified and technically savvy Marines attend 
AMC. Marines with the greatest likelihood of graduation are those who possess an 
average PROCON marking of 44 or above. Future research should focus on the validity 
and standardization of a Marine’s PROCON markings in an effort to more accurately 
assess a suitable threshold for each target audience category. 
Advanced Mortarman Course (2016) describes their target population as “A 
Marine Mortarman (0341) Corporal or Sergeant Squad Leader.”  They also reinforce the 
composition of their target population under the prerequisite sections, however, they 
accept waivers, stipulating that “Lance Corporals may attend when filling a squad leader 
billet” (p. I-2). Sample analysis reveals that while AMCs intended target audience should 
be senior Mortarman, they are in fact, composed primarily of LCpls, accounting for 58 
percent of the sample. 
My third finding links the high numbers of LCpls in the sample, with the 
predictive power of TIG. As data reveals LCpls with less than 18 months TIG are at a 
higher risk of failure than those with more than 18 months. I recommend changing the 
current prerequisite policy to include a provision granting admission to only those LCpls 
with a minimum of 18 months TIG. Deferment allows operational units to better prepare 
and guide their small unit leaders in the execution of their duties. It also provides them 
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with additional time and experience operating their designated mortar systems, 
presumably increased technical and proficiency levels. 
Results from this study reinforce many of the findings in the wider body of 
literature linking key determinants of success to a variety of military training schools. 
The greater majority of previous research identifies that GT scores, PROCON markings, 
physical fitness metrics and rifle scores are meaningful predictors of success. This study 
shows similar results across many of these variables, however, it highlights the difference 
in predictive power associated with Marine Corps standardized physical and performance 
metrics (CFT and rifle scores). AMC relies heavily on cognitive and MOS technical 
proficiency, which are elements operational commanders can use to better screen and 
select future candidates. 
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